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Abstract
We consider a frictionless constant endowment economy based on Leeper (1991).
In this economy, it is shown that, under an ad-hoc monetary rule and an ad-hoc
scal rule, there are two equilibria. One has active monetary policy and passive
scal policy, while the other has passive monetary policy and active scal policy. We
consider an extended set-up in which the policy maker minimizes a loss function
under quasi-commitment, as in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007). Under this
formulation there exists a unique Ramsey equilibrium, with an interest rate peg
and a passive scal policy.
JEL classication numbers: E63, C61, C62, E43, E44, E47, E52, E58.
Keywords: Frictionless endowment economy, Fiscal theory of the Price Level,
Ramsey optimal policy, Interest Rate Rule, Fiscal Rule.
1 Introduction
Monetary and scal interactions are often presented using Leepers (1991) model of fric-
tionless endowment economies. This model includes the intertemporal budget constraint
of the government and a Fisher relation with a constant real interest rate equal to the
representative households discount factor. In Leeper (1991), for monetary policy, the in-
terest rate responds in proportion to ination. For scal policy, a lump-sum tax responds
in proportion to the stock of real public debt.
Assuming ination, interest rate and lump-sum tax are forward-looking variables
for seeking equilibria with Blanchard and Kahns (1980) determinacy condition, Leeper
(1991) obtains two equilibria for monetary and scal interactions. These two equilibria
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are dened by ranges of values of the parameters of ad hoc policy rules. In the rst equi-
librium, the interest rate rule parameter destabilizes ination ("active monetary policy"
according to Leeper (1991)) and the scal rule parameter stabilizes public debt ("passive
scal policy" according to Leeper (1991)). In the second equilibrium related to the scal
theory of the price level, the scal rule parameter destabilizes public debt ("active pol-
icy" according to Leeper (1991)) and the interest rate rule parameter stabilizes ination
("passive monetary policy" according to Leeper (1991)). A peg of the interest rate with a
lack of response of the interest rate to ination is a particular case of a "passive monetary
policy" equilibrium.
This note demonstrates that Ramsey optimal policy is a third equilibrium with an
optimal interest rate peg and "passive" scal policy.
Section two presents the policy transmission mechanism, the two equilibria with ad
hoc policy rules and the Ramsey optimal policy equilibrium. Section three concludes.
2 Ramsey Optimal Policy in a Frictionless Endow-
ment Economy
2.1 Policy Transmission Mechanism
Bai and Leeper (2017) and Cochrane (2019, chapter 2) omit money in the frictionless
endowment economy model with respect to Leepers (1991) seminal paper, while still
obtaining Leepers (1991) two regimes for monetary and scal interactions.
Consider an innitely-lived representative consumer who receives a constant endow-
ment of goods each period in the amount y and derives utility only from consumption ct.
The government purchases a constant quantity of goods g > 0 from the consumer each
period. We impose equilibrium in the goods market, so that consumption: ct = y   g.
The consumer makes a consumption-saving decision that produces the Fisher relation
where the real rate is here equal to a constant discount rate:
Et
1
t+1
=
1

1
Rt
(1)
where Rt is both the gross one-period nominal interest rate on nominal bonds bought
at t and pay o¤ in t + 1 and the monetary policy instrument, and t+1 = Pt+1=Pt is the
gross rate of ination between t and t+1, with Pt the aggregate price level. In the steady
state, Pt = Pt+1 )  = 1 where  is the ination target. Then, R = = = 1=,
is the nominal interest rate consistent with the ination target according to the Fisher
relation. The equilibrium real interest rate is constant at r = (1=)  1 where 0 <  < 1
is the consumers discount factor. The Fisher relation in deviation of steady state values
is:
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1
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  1
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
1
Rt
  

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It is linearized around the steady state equilibrium:
Ett+1    =  (Rt  R)) Ett+1   1 = 

Rt   1


:
Fiscal policy levies lump-sum taxes of t and sets purchases to be constant, g > 0
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with primary surplus st = t  g. Government issues one-period nominal bonds, Bt, that
satisfy the ow constraint, where Pt is the aggregate price level and real debt is dened
as bt = Bt=Pt.
bt =
Bt
Pt
=   (t   g) +Rt 1Pt 1
Pt
Bt 1
Pt 1
=   (t   g) + Rt 1
t
bt 1:
Using the Fisher relation, we substitute the constant real interest rate in the govern-
ment intertemporal budget constraint:
bt =   (t   g) + 1

bt 1:
The dynamics of real debt does not depend on ination or on the nominal rate Rt.
The steady state level of real government debt has an exogenous value: bt+1 = bt = b
.
To be consistent with the government intertemporal budget constraint, the steady state
level of tax revenue   is equal to the steady state interest expense:
    g =

1

  1

b:
The government intertemporal budget constraint written in deviation of steady state
is
bt   b =   (st   s) + 1

(bt 1   b):
The linearized dynamics are (in deviation from steady state):

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
=
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+
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
:
The log-linearized dynamics of ination is:
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:
The log-linearized dynamics of real debt is:
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Log-linearized dynamics are:
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2.2 Ad Hoc Policy Rules
The scal authority adjusts lump-sum tax in response to the level of real government
debt. Monetary policy follows an interest rate rule that responds to ination:
st   s = Gb (bt 1   b) + "st and Rt  R = F (t   ) + "Rt
Shocks "Rt , "
s
t are assumed to be independently and identically distributed, with mean
zero and a non-zero variance-covariance matrix. The linearized dynamics are:

Et
1
t+1
  1

Et 1bt+1   b

=

1

F 0
0 1

 Gb

t   
bt   b

+

 0
0  1

"Rt
"st

with b0 given.
Public debt is the only predetermined variable. Blanchard and Kahns (1980) deter-
minacy condition implies that one eigenvalue should be inside the unit circle and one
should be outside the unit circle. Either the ination eigenvalue is outside the unit circle
jFj > 1 and the public debt eigenvalue
 1  Gb < 1 is inside the unit circle (rst equi-
librium) or it is the reverse (second equilibrium): jFj < 1 and
 1  Gb > 1 (Leeper
(1991)).
2.3 Ramsey Optimal Policy under Quasi-Commitment
In a monetary policy regime indexed by j, a policy maker may re-optimize on each future
period with exogenous probability 1   q strictly below one. Following Schaumburg and
Tambalotti (2007), we assume that the mandate to minimize the loss function is delegated
to a sequence of policy makers with a commitment of random duration. The degree of
credibility is modelled as if it is a change of policy-maker with a given probability of
reneging commitment and re-optimizing optimal plans. The length of their tenure or
"regime" depends on a sequence of exogenous independently and identically distributed
Bernoulli signals ftgt0 with Et [t]t0 = 1  q, with 0 < q  1. If t = 1; a new policy
maker takes o¢ce at the beginning of time t. Otherwise, the incumbent stays on. A
higher probability q can be interpreted as a higher credibility. A policy maker with little
credibility does not give a large weight on future welfare losses. The policy maker j solves
the following problem for regime j, omitting subscript j, before policy maker k starts:
V j0 =  E0
t=+1X
t=0
(q)t

1
2
 
Q (t   )2 +Qb (bt   b)2 + R (Rt  R)2 + s (st   s)

+ (1  q)V kt

Rt  R = q (Ett+1   ) +  (1  q)
 
Et
k
t+1   

bt   b = q(Etbt+1   b) +  (1  q)
 
Etb
k
t+1   b

+ q(st   s) +  (1  q) (skt   s).
Ination and public debt expectations are an average between two terms. The rst
term, with weight q is the ination and public debt, respectively, that would prevail
under the current regime upon which there is commitment. The second term with weight
1  q is the ination and public debt, respectively, that would be implemented under the
alternative regime by policy maker k.
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This optimal program is a discounted linear quadratic regulator (LQR) with a "credi-
bility adjusted" discount factor q. The log-linear version of the dynamic system can also
be used instead of the linear version. Preferences of the policy maker are rstly given by
positive weights for the two policy targets Q  0, Q  0 (Q = diag(Q; Qb)). Secondly,
there are at least two non-zero policy makers preferences for interest rate smoothing and
primary surplus and tax smoothing, with strictly positive weights for these two policy
instruments in the loss function: R > 0, s > 0 (R = diag(R; s)). This ensures the
strict concavity of the LQR program which implies the determinacy (uniqueness) of the
solution of this Stackelberg dynamic game, if the system of the transmission mechanism
is controllable.
All the results are valid for nearly negligible cost of changing the policy instruments:
a minimal interest rate smoothing parameter (R  10 7), a minimal tax smoothing
parameter (s  10 7) and a minimal credibility (a non zero probability of not reneging
commitment next period: 10 7  q  1).
If R = 0 or s = 0 or if the costs of changing the policy instruments are not strictly
convex or if q = 0, the results are no longer valid. If q = 0, the policy maker knows that
he is replaced next period. He does static optimization ((q)0 = 1) of his current period
quadratic loss function subject to a static transmission mechanism where he considers
the expectations terms related to the next period policy maker as exogenous intercepts
(Chatelain and Ralf (2020)).
Proposition 1 For the transmission mechanism of the Fisher relation with constant real
rate and the government intertemporal budget constraint, Ramsey optimal policy has a
unique equilibrium. The interest rate is pegged at its long run value Rt = R
. A feedback
Taylor rule is not optimal and the Taylor principle should not be satised: F  = 0 < .
This is a "passive monetary policy". The optimal auto-correlation of monetary policy
shocks is zero: 
"R
= 0. The optimal variance of monetary policy shocks is zero 2
"R
= 0.
Ination jumps to its steady state value instantaneously following monetary policy shocks
0 = 0, as in a degenerate rational expectations model without predetermined variables.
Hence, the price level is constant. Ramsey optimal scal rule has a negative feedback
parameter ("passive scal policy") with ensures the local stability of public debt dynamics.
There are two stable eigenvalues giving the optimal persistence of ination ( = 0) and
the optimal persistence of public debt (0 < b < 1).
Proof. Ramsey optimal policy amounts to nd the solution of a linear quadratic regulator
(Chatelain and Ralf (2019)). The autocorrelation parameters of policy makers shocks
are optimally set to zero, else they increase the volatility of ination and of public debt
in the policy makers loss function. The optimal expected value of the loss function is:
L =  1
2
 b0 bb0 P b0 bb0 T with P =  P PbPb Pb

, (3)
b0 = 0    and bb0 = b0   b. (4)
where P is a positive symmetric square matrix of dimension two which is the solution
of the discrete algebraic Riccati equation (DARE) of the LQR. The optimal initial anchor
of ination 0 on public debt b0 is given by:
@L
@t

t=0
= Pb0 + Pbbb0 = 0) b0 = PbP bb0 if P 6= 0: (5)
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This initial transversality (or natural boundary) condition eliminates the indetermi-
nacy of initial ination 0 put forward for the ad hoc policy rules solution. Because the
system is decoupled (Ab = Ab = 0) and because the weight on the product tbt is zero
in the loss function Qb = 0, this implies a zero weight Pb = 0 in the optimal value of
the loss function. Therefore, P  0 and Pb  0 are solutions of scalar discrete algebraic
Riccati equations (DARE). Because the system of the policy transmission mechanism is
decoupled, the optimal program is identical if we consolidate the central bank and the
treasury as a single policy maker or if we consider that they are distinct policy makers.
For ination, this DARE equation is:
P = Q + A
0
PA   
0
A
0
PBR (R+B
0
RPBR)
 1
B
0
RPA = Q:
Because Ab = Ab = A = 0, this implies that the optimal loss function parameter
P is equal to the ination weight in the loss function: P = Q. Therefore, if the
policy maker has a non-zero weight on ination volatility in his loss function Q > 0,
optimal initial ination is zero because Pb = 0: 

0 = 0. Because ination dynamics are
decoupled from the dynamics of predetermined public debt, ination behaves exactly as
in a degenerate rational equilibrium model where there is no predetermined variable. At
any date t, if ever there is a monetary policy shock "Rt , ination instantaneously jumps
back to equilibrium t = 0. There are no transitory dynamics. The volatility of ination
is zero.
Because the open-loop system is already at the zero lower bound of ination persis-
tence (A = 0) and because there is a non-zero cost of interest rate volatility (R > 0)
in the loss function, it is optimal to set an interest rate peg Rt = R
. Therefore, the
quadratic term of interest rate volatility R (Rt  R)2 is minimized at its zero lower
bound zero in the loss function. This implies a Taylor rule parameter equal to zero:
F  = 0 < , a zero auto-correlation of monetary policy shocks "R = 0, and a zero
variance of monetary policy shocks 2
"R
= 0 initiated by the policy maker.
If there is a zero cost of ination in the loss function (Q = 0), the policy maker does
not care about ination. There is an indeterminacy for the optimal choice of the initial
value of ination 0. However, the implied volatility originated by this indeterminacy
does not matter in the policy makers loss function.
For public debt, the solution is a scalar case of Ramsey optimal policy under quasi-
commitment (we use the linear dynamics instead of the log-linear dynamics).
Etbt+1   b = 1p
q
(bt   b) 
p
q(st   s) with Ab = 1
q
or qA = 1 and Bbs =  1:
Optimal public debt persistence (or auto-correlation or closed-loop eigenvalue) is the
stable root of the characteristic polynomial of the Hamiltonian system:
0 = 2   S+ 1
q
with 2 =
1
q
with
S = A+
1
Aq
+
B2
A
Qb
s
= 1 +
1
q
+ q
Qb
s
0 < b (s; q) =
1
2

S  
r
S2   4
q

< 1:
The optimal public debt persistence or autocorrelation b increases with the cost s
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of changing the policy instrument (lump sum taxes). Its boundaries are given by limits
when the cost of changing policy instrument s tends to zero and when tends s to
innity:
lim
s!0
b (s; q) = lim
b!0
1
2

q
s
  q
s

= 0 and lim
s!+1
b (s; q) =
1
qA
= 1:
The scal rule parameter Gb remains in the range of values so that the persistence of
public debt is strictly positive and strictly below one:
1
q
  1 < Gb =
b   A
B
=
1
q
  b <
1
q
.
The optimal loss function parameter Pb is:
Pb =
1
A
Qb
q
1  b
=
Qb
1  b
.
It is also the solution of a scalar algebraic Riccati quadratic equation. For a given
initial value of predetermined public debt b0 and for preferences Qb  0 which can be
equal to zero, the optimal expected value of the policy maker loss function is:
If Q > 0 : L
 =  1
2

0 bb0 
 
Q 0
0 Qb
1 
b
!
0 bb0 T =   12 Qb1  b (b0   b)2 :
If Q = 0 : L
 =  1
2
 b0 bb0 
 
0 0
0 Qb
1 
b
! b0 bb0 T =   12 Qb1  b (b0   b)2 :
A rational policy maker with quadratic preferences including a convex cost of changing
policy instruments (interest rate smoothing R > 0 and tax smoothing s > 0) taking
into account private sector expectations with a minimal credibility (q > 0) eliminates the
indeterminacy of initial ination 0 if the policy makers preferences includes a non-zero
weight (Q > 0) on ination volatility in his loss function. Else, a rational policy maker
neglects the indeterminacy of initial ination because ination volatility has zero weight
(Q = 0) in his loss function. A SCILAB code is available from the authors to solve
Ramsey optimal policy with numerical values.
3 Conclusion
For the model of frictionless endowment economies, Ramsey optimal policy is an interest
rate peg and a "passive" scal policy. It is a third equilibrium with respect to Leepers
(1991) two equilibria with simple feedback rules.
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